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THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA AS A
"PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION":
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Timothy Curran ("Curran") was a member of Troop 37 of the
Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America ("BSA") for over
four years. Eventually, plaintiff attained the rank of Eagle Scout, "the
highest rank a Boy Scout can reach."' Among other activities, he
participated in leadership programs, was elected to two "honor camping
organizations," and attended the BSA's "National Jamboree" in 1977.'
Curran remained active in the Boy Scouts until his eighteenth birthday
in October 1979.4
Later the next year, in June and July 1980, the Oakland Tribune
published a series on gay teenagers in which Curran agreed to an
interview and identified himself as openly gay.5 The Executive Director
of the Mount Diablo Council was alerted to the existence of the article
but took no action until Curran submitted an application to attend the
1981 Boy Scouts of America National Jamboree. 6  When Curran
received notice that "only those adults who had been admitted as
'scouters'--adult scoutmasters or assistant scoutmasters-were eligible
to attend the national jamboree," he attempted to apply for an assistant
scoutmaster position.7 The Mount Diablo Council responded in part:
"[w]e need to set an appointment to discuss this, but we can't accept that
application."8
Curran was later informed that the Council rejected his application
because of his homosexuality.9 After a meeting with the Executive
Director of the Mount Diablo Council and a hearing by the Western
Region of the BSA, Curran filed suit and claimed that the BSA's
"rejection of his application to become an assistant scoutmaster violated
1. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, 952 P.2d 218,220 (Cal. 1998)(Curran II).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 220.
6. See id. at 221.
7. Id.
& Id.
9. See id.
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the Unruh Civil Rights Act."'
The Supreme Court of California faced this factual scenario in the
case of Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America."
The court did not side with Curran. 2 Instead, it decided that the BSA
was free to discriminate against any individual that it chose to. 3
Timothy Curran, if he wanted to remain active in the BSA, would have
to move from California to a different state that did not permit the BSA
to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
In a remarkably similar factual situation, James Dale ("Dale")
entered the BSA as a Cub Scout when he was eight years old.'4 Dale,
who eventually advanced to the rank of Eagle Scout, was considered a
"devoted and exemplary" member of the organization.1 5  He
participated in the "Order of the Arrow," "an affiliated honor camping
association," attended the 1985 National Boy Scout Jamboree as a
delegate, and held many leadership positions within his troop.
16
From approximately March 1989 to August 1990, Dale served as an
Assistant Scoutmaster for Troop 73 in Matawan, New Jersey, after
completing an application for adult membership and receiving approval
from the BSA.'7 However, on August 5, 1990, Dale received a letter
from James W. Kay, Council Executive of Monmouth Council, that read
in part:
After careful review, we have decided that your registration with
the Boy Scouts of America should be revoked. We are therefore
compelled to request that you sever any relations that you may
have with the Boy Scouts of America.
You should understand that BSA membership registration is a
10. Id. at 222. The Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh") is the common name for
California Civil Code section 51, California's public accommodation statute. Id. at 219. For
more on Unruh, see infra Part IV.B.
11. 952 P.2d 218,218-19 (Cal. 1998) (Curran II).
12. See id. at 238-39.
13. See id. at 239. The court noted that, "even though the provisions of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act do not apply to the membership policies of the Boy Scouts," other legal grounds
exist for Curran to attack the membership policies. Id. One such example is "the denial of
tax exempt status" for organizations that continue to discriminate without penalty. Id. (citing
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) ("upholding denial of federal tax-
exempt status to private school that engaged in racial discrimination")).
14. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
aff'd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
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privilege and is not automatically granted to everyone who
applies. We reserve the right to refuse registration whenever
there is a concern that an individual may not meet the high
standards of membership which the BSA seeks to provide for
American youth.8
Dale wrote to Kay to request a reason for the decision and was
informed by Kay that the BSA "specifically forbid[s] membership to
homosexuals."1 9  Kay "became aware that [Dale] was an affirmed
homosexual after reading the July 8, 1990 issue of the Newark Star-
Ledger in which Dale was pictured in an article entitled 'Seminar
Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens' and labeled as the 'co-
president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance.""
As a result, Dale claims that he was "stripped of all his scouting
honors, including his Eagle Scout status" and was denied the
opportunity to remain the Assistant Scoutmaster of Troop 73.21
James Dale brought suit in Dale v. Boy Scouts of American and
maintained that the "BSA is a place of public accommodation...
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of affectional or sexual
orientation." 3 In an opinion issued on August 4, 1999, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey confirmed that the BSA classified as a "place of
public accommodation."24  Therefore, the BSA was not free to
discriminate against Dale on the basis of his sexual preference.'
Accordingly, James Dale was permitted to serve as a Scoutmaster for
the BSA in New Jersey, whereas he would not be allowed to do so in
18. Id. (quoting Letter from James W. Kay, Council Executive of Monmouth Council, to
James Dale (July 19,1990)).
19. Id. (quoting Letter from James W. Kay, Council Executive of Monmounth Council,
to James Dale (Aug. 10, 1990)).
20. Id.; see Kinga Borondy, Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark), July 8,1990, § 2, at 11.
21. Id. at 276.
22. 706 A.2d 270, affd 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999). For a full discussion of the Dale
decision, see infra Part IV.A.
23. Id. at 277. Dale's claim of discrimination was analyzed under New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination ("LAD") (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 (West 1999)). See id. at
277-78. Under LAD, "affectional or sexual orientation" was defined as "male or female
heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality by inclination, practice, identity or expression,
having a history thereof or being perceived, presumed or identified by others as having such
an orientation." Id. (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5hh (West 1999)). For further
discussion of New Jersey's LAD, see infra Parts IV.A, V.
24. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1229.
25. See id.
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California.
This Comment seeks to reconcile the differing opinions of California
and New Jersey within the arena of "public accommodation" law. Part
II provides background for the laws of "public accommodation" and
pertinent details about the BSA. Part III of this Comment discusses the
history of challenges to the BSA's discriminatory policies. Part IV will
examine the Dale and Curran H decisions in full. Finally, this Comment
will demonstrate that the discrepancies in public accommodation
decisions are due, in large part, to the courts' methods of statutory
construction. In particular, this Comment suggests that state courts
should adopt the Dale interpretation of the term "place" as a "term of
convenience, not of limitation,"26 rather than the narrower construction
of the term as utilized by the Supreme Court of California in Curran H.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to better understand the decisions regarding the BSA's
membership policies, it is necessary to examine the history of public
accommodation challenges to other organizations with restrictive
membership policies. Then, an overview of the history of the BSA, its
organizational goals, and membership policies follows.
A. Public Accommodation Law
Public accommodation law governs the rights of individuals and
organizations to discriminate or restrict access to "public
accommodations" '27 on the basis of "race, sex, religion, or the like."'
Congress began to experiment with laws forbidding such restriction in
response to increasing problems with racial discrimination in places of
public accommodation. 29 Congress eventually enacted Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Unlike previous statutes that prohibited
discrimination in public accommodations, Title II was upheld as
26. Dale, 706 A.2d at 279 (quoting National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball
Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)).
27. A "public accommodation" is defined as a "business establishment, that provides
lodging, food, entertainment, or other services to the public; esp. (as defined by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964), one that affects interstate commerce or is supported by State action."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1242 (7th ed. 1999).
28. John E. Theuman, Annotation, Exclusion or Expulsion from Association or Club as
Violation of State Civil Rights Act, 38 A.L.R. 4th 628, 629 (1985).
29. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 28, at 337 (1976).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(b) (1999). For further discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-
(b), see infra Parts III.A.2, V.
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constitutional.3'
While Title II contains an extensive list of entities that Congress
clearly defined as public accommodations,' courts have had
considerable difficulty deciding whether "purely private clubs or other
establishments which are not in fact open to the public" fit under Title
H.13 The key in most inquiries is the distinction between an association
or a club that is "truly private" and those that constitute a "public
business or accommodation which must be open to all.""' Generally, the
outcome of these cases hinges on the "precise terms" of the particular
civil rights act, including the term "place of public accommodation." '35
While relying on "precise terms" of civil rights acts, courts also consider
a variety of other factors when deciding whether an organization is a
place of public accommodation. 6 One commentator suggested that
courts consider the following: "[T]he extent of an association's
commercial activities or provision of services to the public, its ties to
state or local government, and the presence or absence of any actual
selectivity in the admission of members beyond the exclusion of the
aggrieved minority. ' 37
In this regard, "[a] number of courts have held that an organization
cannot be a 'place' of public accommodation unless it conducts its
activities at a fixed location."' On the other hand, a minority of courts
have decided that "even legitimate public service organizations" provide
the general public with "commercial" business services.39
31. See id. For example, the Federal Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875 prohibited
"racial discrimination in serveral [sic] types of public accommodations." Id. However, the
Act was declared unconstitutional because it violated principles of federalism. See id.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4). Examples are inns, motels, restaurants,
laundromats, and museums.
33. Theuman, supra note 28, at 629.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 629-30; see United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Alaska
1983) (holding that a nonprofit corporation with policy of not admitting women as full
members was not a "place" of public accommodation because it had no "fixed geographical
situs"); see United States Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding that an organization was not a "place" of public accommodation because it "[did]
not operate from any particular place").
39. Theuman, supra note 28, at 630; see National Org. for Women v. Little League
Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 38 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (finding that ball field where
Little League operates is a "'place' of public accommodation"); United States Power
Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (N.Y. 1983) (holding
that no fixed location necessary for place of public accommodation); United States Jaycees v.
1999]
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B. History and Policies of the BSA
In 1909, a boy came to the aid of Chicago publisher William D.
Boyce, who was lost in the London fog.' After the boy guided Boyce to
safety, Boyce offered him a tip.4' The boy refused, "explaining that as a
Scout he would not take a tip for doing a Good Turn."' 2 Inspired by this
encounter, Boyce sought a meeting with Robert S. Baden-Powell, a
British military hero credited with founding the Boy Scouts in Great
Britain.43 Boyce returned to the United States and incorporated the Boy
Scouts of America under the laws of the District of Columbia on
February 8, 1910.' The BSA was incorporated "to provide a program
for community organizations that offers effective character, citizenship,
and personal fitness training for youth."4 Further, the organization
seeks to
develop American citizens who are physically, mentally, and
emotionally fit; have a high degree of self-reliance as evidenced
in such qualities as initiative, courage, and resourcefulness; have
personal values based on religious concepts; have the desire and
skills to help others; understand the principles of the American
social, economic, and governmental systems; are knowledgeable
about and take pride in their American heritage and understand
our nation's role in the world; have a keen sense of respect for the
basic rights of all people; and are prepared to participate in and
give leadership to American society. '
Congress chartered the BSA in 1916."7 Through incorporation, "Boy
Scouting is made available to community organizations having similar
McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1981) (holding that an organization need not operate
on a "permanent site" to be a place of public accommodation).
40. See The Boy Scouts of America, Fact Sheet: What Is Boy Scouting? (visited Feb. 23,
1999) <http:lwww.bsa.scouting.orglfactsheetsl02-503.html> (on file with Marquette Law
Review) [hereinafter Fact Sheet What Is Boy Scouting?].
41. See id.
42. The Boy Scouts of America, Fact Sheet: Founders of Scouting and the BSA (visited
Feb. 23, 1999) <http:llwww.bsa.scouting.orglfactsheets/02-211.html> (on file with Marquette
Law Review) [hereinafter Fact Sheet Founders of Scouting].
43. See id.
44. See The Boy Scouts of America, Historical Highlights-1910's (visited Feb. 23, 1999)
<http://www.bsa.scouting.org/factsheets/02-511/1910.html> (on fie with Marquette Law
Review) [hereinafter Historical Highlights-1910's].
45. Fact Sheet: What is Boy Scouting?, supra note 40.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1212 (N.J. 1999).
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interests and goals."' An organization that takes a charter through the
BSA is responsible for providing volunteer "leadership," facilities, and
other "support for the troop activities.""9 "[P]rofessional organizations;
governmental bodies; and religious, educational, civic, fraternal,
business, labor, and citizens' groups" serve as chartered organizations.'
In this respect, Section 3 of the Charter reads as follows:
That the purpose of this corporation shall be to promote,
through organization, and cooperation with other agencies, the
ability of boys to do things for themselves and others, to train
them in Scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-
reliance, and kindred virtues, using the methods which are now
in common use by the Boy Scouts.
Furthermore, the Charter also provides that the "object and
purposes [of the BSA are] solely of a benevolent character and not for
pecuniary profit to its members." Finally, the BSA bylaws reinforce
the "nonprofit" status of local BSA councils: "Clause 1. Local councils
duly chartered by the Boy Scouts of America shall, wherever possible,
become incorporated under the laws of their respective states pertaining
to nonprofit corporations and pursuant to and consistent with these By-
laws and the Rules and Regulations of the Boy Scouts of America." 3
Scout membership in the BSA is "open to all who meet the
membership requirement."'  Generally, membership privileges are
extended "to boys who have earned the Arrow of Light," Cub
Scouting's5 highest award, or "have completed the fifth grade, or who
are 11 through 17 years old." 6 Adult leaders volunteer for positions,
with a caveat that "no person shall be approved as a leader unless, in the
48. Fact SheeL What Is Boy Scouting?, supra note 40.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, 891 P.2d 385, 387-388 (Kan. 1995) (quoting
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA CHARTER § 3).
52. Id. at 388 (quoting BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA CHARTER § 3).
53. Id. (quoting BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA BYLAWS, art. VI, § 6).
54. Id. (quoting BOY SCOUTS OFAMERICA BYLAWS, art. VI, § 1).
55. "Cub Scouting" is a "home-and neighborhood-centered program for boys 9 to 11
years of age" started in 1930 by the BSA. The Boy Scouts of America, Fact Sheet: What Is
Cub Scouting? (visited November 3, 1999) <http:llwww.bsa.scouting.orglfactsheets/02-
0502.html> (on file with Marquette Law Review) [hereinafter Fact Sheet: What Is Cub
Scouting?].
56. Fact Sheet" What Is Boy Scouting?, supra note 40.
1999]
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judgment of the Corporation, that person possesses the moral,
educational, and emotional qualities deemed necessary for leadership
and satisfies such other leadership qualifications as it may from time to
time require.""7
In 1911, the BSA had 61,495 members.m Currently, that number has
grown to over one million active Boy Scouts and Varsity Scouts and
over 500,000 adult volunteers in 53,174 troops or teams.59 As of 1993,
the BSA has had over ninety million members in its lifetime.'
III. THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION
LAW
The issue of whether the BSA is a place of public accommodation is
one that has "vexed the courts for years."61 Although Oregon was the
first state to address the issue in Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of America,6 the
decision by no means set a standard for other states. Of the four states
to examine the issue before 1998, Connecticut and California held that
the BSA was a place of public accommodation under their respective
state civil rights acts.6 Kansas and Oregon disagreed. 4 Additionally,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
America,6 sided with Kansas and Oregon when it held that the scouting
organization was not a "place of public accommodation. '' 6
To further confuse the issue, in the spring of 1998 California and
New Jersey released opinions deciding the issue. California, in Curran
57. Seabourn, 891 P.2d at 388 (quoting BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA BYLAWS, art. VIII, §
1).
58. Historical Highlights-1910's, supra note 44.
59. Fact Sheet: What Is Boy Scouting?, supra note 40.
60. The Boy Scouts of America, Historical Highlights-1990's (visited Feb. 23, 1999)
<http://www.bsa.scouting.orglfactsheets/02-511/1990.html> (on fie with Marquette Law
Review).
61. Discrimination Law: Scouts' Ban on Gays Splits the Courts, A.B.A. J., June 1998, at
46.
62. 551 P.2d 465 (Or. 1976). For a full discussion of Schwenk, see infra Part III.1.A.
63. See Quinnipiac Council v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d
352 (Conn. 1987); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712,
195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (Ct. App. 1983) (Curran I).
64. See Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, 891 P.2d 385, 387 (holding that the "Boy
Scouts [of America] is not 'public accommodation' under the Kansas Act Against
Discrimination .... "); Schwenk, 551 P.2d at 469 ("the term 'place of public accommodation'
as used in the Act [Oregon's Public Accommodation Act]... was not intended to include the
Boy Scouts of America...").
65. 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
66. Id. at 1269-75.
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II, reversed its stance and held that BSA was not covered by Unruh,
California's public accommodation statute.67 New Jersey, on the other
hand, decided that the organization fit within its statutory description as
a place of public accommodation.6 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
affirmed this decision on January 5, 1999.69
A. Boy Scouts of America is not a Place of Public Accommodation
1. Oregon's Public Accommodation Act and Schwenk
Carla Schwenk was the first individual to allege that the BSA's
admission policies violated a state civil rights act. The Oregon Supreme
Court, in Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of America,70 held that the BSA was
not required to accept the membership application of a nine-year-old
female, Carla Schwenk.71 Specifically, the court determined that "the
term place of public accommodation, as defined by... [Oregon's Public
Accommodations Act] was not intended by the Oregon legislature to
include the Boy Scouts of America."'
In Schwenk, the Supreme Court of Oregon examined the language
of the Public Accommodation Act to determine if Carla Schwenk had a
legitimate claim.7 The Oregon Public Accommodation Act defines a
"place of public accommodation" as "any place or service offering to the
public accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges whether in
the nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements or otherwise."'74 The
Act "does not include any institution, bona fide club or place of
accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private."'75
The Schwenk court inferred that the legislative history behind the
Act proposed to "prohibit discrimination by business or commercial
67. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, 952 P.2d 218, 220 (Cal. 1998) (Curran II)
(holding that BSA does not fall within the category of "business establishments" as that
language is used in the Unruh Civil Rights Act.); see also Randall v. Orange County Council,
952 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1998) (companion case to Curran II).
68. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 274 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
affd, 734 A.2d 1196 (NJ. 1999) (holding that the BSA "is a place of public accommodation
under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination ("LAD")).
69. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (NJ. 1999).
70. 551 P.2d 465 (Or. 1976).
71. See id. at 469.
72. Id. at 469.
73. Id. at 466-69.
74. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.675(1) (1997).
75. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.675(2). This and similar language in civil rights statutes is
typically defined as "private club" or "distinctly private" exceptions. Id.
1999]
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enterprises which offer goods or services to the public."76 The court
concluded that although the BSA is a chartered organization, it does not
"offer goods [or] services to the public" and therefore falls outside the
purview of the Act.77
2. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Welsh
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Welsh v. Boy
Scouts of America, addressed a "matter of first impression for the
federal courts" under Title H.78 This decision, handed down in 1993,
sided with the Oregon Supreme Court's conclusion that the BSA was
not a place of public accommodation.
Welsh involved a father and his seven-year-old son who refused to
affirm his belief in God." The father and son were denied admission to
the scout troop on the grounds that the son, Mark, refused to "comply
with [BSA's] Constitution and By-laws.""1 Specifically, Welsh violated
the ideal promulgated in the Scout Oath.' The Scout Oath reads, "On
my honor I will do my best to do my duty to God and my country and to
obey the Scout Law, to help other people at all times, To keep myself
physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight."' Mark and
Elliot Welsh subsequently filed suit against the BSA for "practicing
unlawful religious discrimination" under Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.' They demanded that the federal courts "force" the BSA to
admit Mark as a member.&
Title II of the Civil Rights Act provides, in pertinent part: "Equal
access. All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin."
Title II also defines a public accommodation as an "entity" whose
76. Schwenk, 551 P.2d at 468 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 469 (emphasis omitted).
78. 993 F.2d 1267, 1268 (7th Cir. 1993).
79. See id. at 1278.
80. See id. at 1268.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See Fact Sheet: What Is Boy Scouting?, supra note 40 (emphasis added).
84. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1268.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1268 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964)).
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operations "affect commerce. '  While examining this language, the
Seventh Circuit concerned itself with Congress's intent when it enacted
Title Hl.' The court, after reading the statute for "its plain meaning,"
concluded that Congress never intended for organizations that lack a
"close connection to a structural facility" to fall within the Title II
definition of "public accommodation." '
The Welsh court acknowledged that state and federal courts have
interpreted state statutes and Title II to apply to groups like the BSA."
However, the court dismissed these decisions. With regard to the state
courts, the Seventh Circuit stated that the respective state public
accommodation statutes were "far broader and more inclusive than" the
87. Id. at 1270 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12,181 (West Supp. 1992)). Defining "public
accommodation" as:
The following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes of
this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce-
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment
located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and
that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of
such proprietor,
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other
sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, travel service, shoe repair service,
funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance
office, professional office or a health care provider, hospital, or other service
establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school,
or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or
recreation.
Id. at 1270, n.2 (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §12,181 (West Supp.
1992)).
88. See id. at 1269.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 1271-72.
1999]
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Title II definition of "public accommodation." 1 As to the federal court
decisions, the Seventh Circuit determined that Title II only applied
when the group "conducted public meetings in public facilities or
operated facilities open to the public."' These "facilities" included
"swimming pools, gyms, sports fields and golf courses."' Notably, the
Seventh Circuit was unable to find a single case that applied Title II to a
"membership organization... whose purpose is not closely connected to
a particular facility."'
Accordingly, the crux of the Seventh Circuit's analysis involved
determining if the BSA was connected to a "structural facility."95 The
record indicated that the "typical Boy Scout gathering" involves boys
meeting privately in a home.6 The court reasoned that the "private
home" is not the "type of facility" classifiable as a "place of public
accommodation" under Title II. Accordingly, the BSA was outside of
the purview of Title II in Welsh 11.98
3. Kansas Act Against Discrimination and Seabourn
Kansas entered the fray in 1995, when the Supreme Court of Kansas
issued its opinion in Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council.99 Here, the
91. Id. at 1271 (citing Quinnipiac Council v. Comm.'n on Human Rights and
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 357-58 (Conn. 1987); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the
Boy Scouts, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712,727, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325,334 (1983)(Curran I); United States
Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764,776 (Minn. 1981)).
92. Id. at 1272 (citing Smith v. YMCA of Montgomery, 462 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1972)
(YMCA operated gymnasiums, a health club and swimming pools); Nesmith v. YMCA of
Raleigh, 397 F.2d 96, 99-100 (4th Cir. 1968) (same); United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club,
713 F. Supp. 785, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 894 F.2d 83 (3d. Cir. 1990) (club operated
swimming pool); Durham v. Red Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 954, 956
(W.D. Tex. 1987) (club owned 400 acres of land for hunting and fishing); United States v.
Slidell Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. La. 1974) (youth football league
owned a recreational facility with fields, grandstand, and a concession stand); Auerbach v.
African Am. Teachers Ass'n, 356 F. Supp. 1046, 1047 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (organization held
public meetings in a public school auditorium); Wesley v. City of Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698,
703 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (city operated a public golf course and was barred from hosting a racially
discriminatory golf tournament); Williams v. Rescue Fire Co., 254 F. Supp. 556, 563 (D. Md.
1966) (non-profit association operated a swimming pool and skating rink)).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1269-76.
96. Id. at 1272 (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp. 1511, 1516 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (Welsh II)).
97. Id. at 1274.
98. See id. at 1276.
99. 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995).
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plaintiff, Bradley Seabourn, active in the BSA for nearly twenty years,
was denied the opportunity to serve as an adult leader with the BSA
after his refusal to reaffirm his belief in God." The refusal was
prompted by Seabourn's letter of September 9, 1991 to the Boy Scouts
Coronado Council President. The letter expressed the following:
When I say the Pledge of Allegiance, I pledge my oath to "one
Nation, under 'nothing."' When I say the Scout oath, I promise
to "do my duty, to 'nothing' and my Country...." When I say
the Scout Law, I say a Scout is "reverent" to "nothing." Call me
a believer in "nothing," a nonbeliever, or call me an Atheist-
they are one and the same."0'
The BSA Coronado Council President responded by rejecting
Seabourn's Boy Scout registration." Seabourn filed suit under the
Kansas Act Against Discrimination ("KAAD")' 3 in September of
1992.10'
Following a grant of summary judgment in which the trial court held
100. See id. at 391.
101. Id. (quoting Letter from Bradley Seabourn to Council President, Coronado Area
Council, Boy Scouts of America (Sept. 9,1991)).
102. See id.
103. The pertinent portions of KAAD read as follows:
The practice or policy of discrimination against individuals in employment relations,
in relation to free and public accommodations, in housing by reason of race, religion,
color, sex, disability, national origin or ancestry or in housing by reason of familial
status is a matter of concern to the state, since such discrimination threatens not only
the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the state of Kansas but menaces the
institutions and foundations of a free democratic state.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001 (1993). Additionally, KAAD defines "public accommodations"
as:
[A]ny person who caters or offers goods, services, facilities and accommodations to
the public. Public accommodations include, but are not limited to, any lodging
establishment or food service establishment, as defined by K.S.A. 36-501 and
amendments thereto; any bar, tavern, barbershop, beauty parlor, theater, skating
rink, bowling alley, billiard parlor, amusement park, recreation park, swimming
pool, lake, gymnasium, mortuary or cemetery which is open to the public; or any
public transportation facility. Public accommodations do not include a religious or
nonprofit fraternal or social association or corporation.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(h) (1993).
104. Seabourn, 891 P.2d at 392.
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that "Boy Scouts is not a public accommodation,"'" the Supreme Court
of Kansas affirmed the opinion of the lower court.1"6 The court focused
on the language of "public accommodation" under KAAD.' 7 Relying
on Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,' the
Seabourn court determined that "public accommodations" include
"those places of business which are held open to the general public and
where members of the general public are invited to come for business
purposes.""'  The court then examined the record to determine the
motives and purposes of the BSA."' It concluded that the BSA has "no
business purpose other than maintaining the objectives and programs to
which the operation of its facilities is merely incidental.'' After
Seabourn, the BSA in Kansas was free to reject the applications of those
unwilling to profess a belief in God.1
B. Boy Scouts of America is a Place of Public Accommodation
Connecticut took a different course from Oregon, Kansas, and the
Seventh Circuit, where, in Quinnipiac Council v. Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
was asked to decide the rights of a woman who was denied the right to
serve as scoutmaster.13 Catherine Pollard, the defendant in Quinnipiac,
applied twice, in 1974, and in 1976, for the position of scoutmaster for
Boy Scout Troop 13.1 Pollard, who had "a long history of active
involvement" with the BSA, served as "de facto scoutmaster" for the
troop periodically from 1972 to 1976.' Nevertheless, BSA rejected
Pollard's application on the grounds that "scoutmasters be men at least
21 years of age."'1
6
After Pollard filed a complaint, the Commission on Human Rights
105. Id. at 387.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 392.
108. 532 P.2d 1263 (Kan. 1975). In Sears, William J. Minner was refused a line of credit
from Sears based upon his race. Id. at 1266. Minner sued under KAAD, and the court held
that any establishment or business "not expressly listed" under KAAD could still fall within
the purview of the Act. Id.
109. 891 P.2d at 399 (emphasis in original).
110. See id. at 406.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 406.
113. 528 A.2d 352, 354 (Conn. 1987).
114. See id. at 355.
115. Id.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
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and Opportunities ("CHRO") determined that Quinnipiac Council was
"statutorily obligated to offer Pollard a position as Scoutmaster... 7
However, on appeal, the trial court disagreed with CHRO and held that,
under Connecticut's public accommodation statute, the BSA was not a
place of public accommodation."' The trial court reasoned that the
position of scoutmaster is not covered under the statute as "'services,'
'goods' or 'facilities.'1
.
9
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, on appeals from both parties,
determined that the "statute [did] not automatically exclude" the BSA
because it had no "fixed physical situs."'  The court then addressed the
issue of discrimination.
The Quinnipiac court focused its "discrimination" inquiry on
whether the BSA was an "'establishment' that serves the general public,
[that] has denied access to its goods and services to a member of a
protected class.' ' . The court, instead of focusing on access to the BSA
"as a whole," limited its inquiry to Pollard's individual access to the
position of scoutmaster.'2 In this regard, her claims specified that
Pollard was "denied access to an 'accommodation' because the plaintiff
denied her the opportunity to be of service to the plaintiff."' 2 However,
117. Id. at 354.
118. See id. at 355.
119. Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46A-64 (West 1995)). In 1987, the statute
provided, in part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to full and equal
accommodations in every place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement,
subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike
to all persons; and any denial of such accommodation by reason of race, creed, color,
national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age or physical disability, including, but
not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant therefor shall be a violation of
the provisions of this section.... A place of public accommodation, resort, or
amusement within the meaning of this section means any establishment, which
caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but
not limited to, public housing projects and all other forms of publicly assisted
housing, and further including any housing accommodation, commercial property or
building lot ....
Id. at 354 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-35(a) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46a-64 (West 1995))).
120. Id. at 358.
121. Id. at 358 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 53-35(a) (current version at CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 1995))).
122. Id. at 359 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122-23
(1985)) (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 360 (emphasis in original).
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because the public accommodation statute does not include the "proffer
of services," the court concluded that there was no deprivation of an
"accommodation" in Quinnipiac. 2 4 Therefore, although the Quinnipiac
court categorized the BSA as a place of public accommodation, it
refused to admit Pollard's claim of discrimination under section 53-35(a)."z
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAW
A. New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination and Dale
Dale alleged that the actions of the BSA violated New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination ("LAD"). 126 LAD provides the following:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment,
and to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of any place of public accommodation, publicly
assisted housing accommodation, and any other real property
without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual
orientation, familial status, or sex, subject only to conditions and
limitations applicable alike to all persons. This opportunity is
recognized as and declared to be a civil right." 7
The statute contains a lengthy list of facilities that fall within the
rubric of "place of public accommodation." ' The statutory language
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (NJ. 1999).
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
128. Id. § 10:5-5.
"A place of public accommodation" shall include, but not be limited to: any tavern,
roadhouse, hotel, motel, trailer camp, summer camp, day camp, or resort camp,
whether for entertainment of transient guests or accommodation of those seeking
health, recreation or rest; any producer, manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retail
shop, store, establishment, or concession dealing with goods or services of any kind;
any restaurant, eating house, or place where food is sold for consumption on the
premises; any place maintained for the sale of ice cream, ice and fruit preparations
or their derivatives, soda water or confections, or where beverages of any kind are
retailed for consumption on the premises; any garage, any public conveyance
operated on land or water, or in the air, any stations and terminals thereof, any
bathhouse, boardwalk, or seashore accommodation; any auditorium, meeting place
or hall; any theatre, motion-picture house, music hall, roof garden, skating rink,
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indicates that the list is not all-inclusive. 29 Additionally, a portion of
LAD excepts any "institution, bona fide club, or place of
accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private."1"
The trial court ruled in favor of the BSA. 3  It concluded that the
LAD definition of place of public accommodation did not encompass
the BSA. 1 2 In fact, the trial court determined that the BSA qualified for
the "private club exception" under LAD."'
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division over-turned
the lower court on both issues." ' With regard to the question of whether
the BSA was a place of public accommodation under LAD, the court
answered affirmatively.1 35 Following the reasoning of Little League,"
and Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp,37 the appellate court held that the
"BSA and its local councils are places of public accommodation.
'
"
13
Specifically, the court reasoned that the "BSA invites 'the public at
large' to join its ranks and is dependent upon the broad-based
participation of members of the general public.
1 39
The Superior Court of New Jersey also disagreed with the trial court
on the issue of whether the BSA qualified for the "private club
exception" under LAD."4 Here, the court determined that as a public
accommodation, the BSA "cannot be characterized as 'distinctly
private.'1.41 Accordingly, the "private club exception" did not cover the
swimming pool, amusement and recreation park, fair, bowling alley, gymnasium,
shooting gallery, billiard and pool parlor, or other place of amusement; any comfort
station; any dispensary, clinic or hospital; any public library; any kindergarten,
primary and secondary school, tradeor business school, high school, academy,
college anduniversity, or any educational institution under the supervision of the
State Board of Education, or the Commissioner of Education of the State of New
Jersey.
Id. § 10:5-5().
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 277.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 283.
135. See id. at 280-83.
136. National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 37 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
137. 210 A.2d 208,211-13 (NJ. 1965).
138. Dale, 706 A.2d at 280.
139. Id. (citations omitted).
140. See id. at 283.
141. Id. The court considered the suggestion that the BSA was not a private club
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BSA in Dale.142
The appellate court's next step was to discuss the BSA's assertion
that its "fundamental right to freedom of expression" allowed it to
discriminate on the basis of sexual preference. 143  Although the trial
judge accepted this argument, the appellate court reversed.'44
Freedom of association was divided into two categories in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees.145 First, "freedom of intimate association" protects
individuals from government intrusion into their "choice to maintain
intimate or private associations with others."' 46 The appellate court,
however, determined that freedom of intimate association was not at
issue in the present case.
"Freedom of expressive association," on the other hand, was
implicated by the facts of Dale." This form of freedom of association
involves "a correlative right to an individual's freedom to speak.' ' 49 The
Roberts court indicated that this right is not "absolute."'' That is,
"compelling state interests" might justify infringement of "freedom of
expressive association" if less intrusive means are not available.''
Following the reasoning of Roberts, the Dale court examined the
record for evidence that the BSA had satisfied its substantial burden of
"demonstrating a strong relationship between its expressive activities
and its discriminatory practice."'' The court asked whether the State of
New Jersey's compelling interest to fight discriminatory practices
through the LAD impinged upon the BSA's rights to expressive
association.'53 The court concluded that the LAD did not affect "in 'any
because of its relatively non-selective membership policies. See id. at 282. However, the
court held that selectivity of membership is not dispositive. See id.
142. Id. at 283.
143. Id. at 284-85.
144. See id. at 284-90.
145. 468 U.S. 609,617 (1984).
146. Dale, 706 A.2d at 285-86 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18).
147. See id. at 286. Roberts posited that "freedom of intimate association" was only
available to those groups having "'relative smallness,' .... selectivity," and "seclusion from
others." Dale, 706 A.2d 285-86 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620). Because the BSA
membership totals nearly five million, "is open to all boys," and engages in "aggressive
advertising," the organization fails to meet the criteria established in Roberts. Id.
148. Id. at 286-88.
149. Id. at 286 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622).
150. Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
151. Id.
152- Id. at 287.
153. See id. at 287-88.
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significant way"' the scouting organization's purposes."
Following the BSA's petition for certification and Dale's cross-
petition for certification on the dismissal claims, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey heard the case on January 5, 1999. The court began its
analysis of the case by highlighting the idea set forth in Fraser.155 places
of public accommodation are "not limited to those enumerated" in
LAD. m Instead, the places listed were meant to be "merely illustrative
of the accommodations the Legislature intended to be within the scope
of the statute."L7 Like the appellate court, the supreme court reasoned
that the outcome of the case should not hinge on the interpretation of
the term "place."M "'[T]o have the LAD's reach turn on the definition
of "place" is irrational because "places do not discriminate; people who
own and operate places do.' 1.59 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey determined that the Boy Scouts, like other membership
groups that meet at a "'moving situs,"" 60 still falls within the auspices of
LAD's definition of "place.
161
The court's next inquiry was whether the BSA is a "public
accommodation."' ' Here, the court used a three-pronged inquiry by
asking (1) whether the organization "engages in broad public
solicitation," (2) whether the organization is closely related with
government or other public accommodations, or (3) whether the
organization is similar to "recognized public accommodations.""
As to the first element of the inquiry, the court enunciated that
"[b]road public solicitation has consistently been a principal
154. Id. at 288. The BSA charter lays out the mission, purposes and fundamental beliefs
of the group. See id. The charter specifies that BSA intends "'to promote... the ability of
boys to do things for themselves and others, to train them in Scoutcraft, and to teach them
patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues."' Id. (quoting BoY SCOUTS OF
AMERICA CHARTER § 3).
155. Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp, 210 A.2d 208,211 (NJ. 1965).
156. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1208 (NJ. 1999) (citing Fraser, 210 A.2d
at 211).
157. Id. (quoting Fraser, 210 A.2d at 211).
15& I& at 1210.
159. Id. (quoting Dale, 706 A.2d at 279 (quoting Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d at
1282 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cummings, J., dissenting))).
160. Id. at 1210 (quoting National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318
A.2d 33, 37 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)). The supreme court explained that a "public
conveyance, like a train" can be a "place" even though it has a moving situs. Little League,
318 A.2d at 37 (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. 10:5-5(1)("public conveyance")).
16L Id. at 1248.
162. Id. at 1210-13.
163. Id. at 1210.
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characteristic of public accommodations." ' In this regard, the BSA's
media campaign is pervasive.' 6' The organization spent more than one
million dollars on a television advertising campaign in 1989.16 Other
advertisements appeared in national periodicals Redbook and Sports
Afield.'67  The court hypothesized, however, that the "invitation
extended by a Boy Scout each time he wears his uniform in public" is
"perhaps the most powerful invitation of all."' '  On these facts, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that the BSA engages in broad
solicitation.69
The Supreme Court of New Jersey then discussed the implications of
the BSA's relationships with government and other public
accommodations. 70 The court recognized that the BSA has a close
relationship with the federal government, the President of the United
States, and the military."7 In fact, since 1910, each President of the
United States has served as Honorary President of the BSA while in
office."n Moreover, the BSA provides that "seventy-eight percent of the
members of the 1 0 0 1h Congress participated in scouting."' 3
The BSA also has close ties with state and local governments." The
court recognized that New Jersey State agencies stock BSA-owned lakes
164. Id. Numerous decisions support the idea that, by extending an invitation to the
public to join, an organization is a "public accommodation." Id. (citing Clover Hill Swimming
Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 219 A.2d 161, 165 (N.J. 1966) (holding that "an establishment which
by advertising or otherwise extends an invitation to the public generally is a place of public
accommodation"); Id. (citing Sellers v. Philip's Barber Shop, 217 A.2d 121, 123-24 (NJ.
1966)(holding that "[an] establishment which caters to the public or by advertising or other
forms of invitation induces patronage generally is a place of public accommodation")).
165. See id. at 1210.
166. See id. at 1211. Kim Foltz of the New York Times described national BSA
advertisements as "hip." Id. (quoting Kim Foltz, TV Ad's Hip Pitch: It's 'Cool' to be a Boy
Scout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1989). A BSA Representative said of the advertising campaign:
"'scouting [is] a product and we've got to get the product into the hands of as many
consumers as we can."' Id. (quoting Foltz, supra) (alteration in original).
167. See id.
168. Id. The court explained that the BSA "invites the curiosity and awareness of
others" by requiring or encouraging that its members wear their uniforms in public. Id.
Several examples are when Scouts wear the uniforms to school, "School Nights," and public
demonstrations. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 1211-13.
171. See id. at 1212. Congress granted a charter to the BSA in 1916. See id. Another
Congressional Act provides the BSA with "equipment, supplies, and services" on behalf of
the federal government. Id.; see 10 U.S.C.A. § 2544 (West 1998).
172. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1213.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 1212.
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with fish and exempt the BSA from having to pay fees to register its
motor vehicles. 5 Local government agencies, such as fire departments,
routinely sponsor scouting units.76 However, the court reasoned that it
is the BSA's close connection with public schools and school-affiliated
groups that "constitutes its single most beneficial governmental
relationship."' ' Public schools and community colleges routinely host
scouting events and provide places for scouts to meet.178
The final step of the Supreme Court of New Jersey's analysis of the
BSA as a public accommodation was to determine whether the BSA
resembled "recognized and enumerated places of public
accommodation. 1 79 The court had little difficulty concluding that the
BSA was a public accommodation." "Given Boy Scouts' public
solicitation activities, and considering its close relationship with
governmental entities, it is not surprising that Boy Scouts resembles
many of the recognized and enumerated places of public
accommodation.'. 1 Past decisions such as Fraser" and Little League8
were used as a benchmark for comparison.& These cases enumerated
the principle that the "'educational or recreational' nature"-the day
camp in Fraser and the baseball field in Little League--of an
organization was a primary factor in whether it was a "place of public
accommodation..' The court noted that the BSA is also of the
"educational and recreational nature."' Given this, the BSA was of the
same nature as "recognized and enumerated places of public
accommodation."'
175. See Ud
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1213. The recruiting tool of "School Nights" is an excellent example of
how intertwined the BSA is with local schools. See id. On "School Nights," schools open
their doors to local scouts to hold meetings and recruit students from that school. See id.
Besides "School Nights," local schools provide facilities for scouts to meet during the school
day. See id. In 1992, close to over 700,000 scouts participated in the "Learning for Life
Curriculum." See id.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 1213.
182. Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp, 210 A.2d 202 (N.J. 1965).
183. National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 312 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1974).
184. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1213; Fraser, 210 A.2d at 202; Little League, 318 A.2d at 37.
185. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1213.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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As a public accommodation, the Dale court explained that the BSA
is subject to the provisions of the LAD in that it cannot "deny any
person 'accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges...
because of.,. sexual orientation.""" Accordingly, the BSA, in similar
arguments to those that it advanced before the appellate court,
contended that it met several of the exceptions to LAD." Specifically,
the BSA argued that, even if it is a public accommodation, it falls
outside of the auspices of LAD because it is (1) "'distinctly private," ' 19
(2) a "religious educational facility,"' 91 and (3) in loco parentis."
188. Id at 1229 (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999)).
189. See id. at 1213.
190. The "distinctly private" or "private club" exception is inherent in the language of
most civil rights statutes. LAD reads, for instance, "[n]othing herein contained shall be
construed to include or to apply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of public
accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private." Id. at 1213 (quoting N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-51 (West 1997)). While the Dale court did not question the BSA's status as a
private club, its inquiry focused on whether the organization was "distinctly private." Id. The
court relied on its decision in Clover Hill v. Swimming Club, Inc., where it declared that "'not
every establishment using the "club" label can be considered "distinctly private".' Id. at
1214 (quoting Clover Hill, 219 A.2d at 165). With this in mind, the court examined the
membership policies of the BSA. See id. 1214-17. Normally, solicitation of a broad
membership and selectivity in membership are factors that courts consider in making the
determination if a club is "distinctly private." See id. at 1214. Looking to a New York
decision, the court distinguished that "'[o]rganizations which routinely accept applicants and
place no subjective limits on the number of persons eligible for membership are not private
clubs." Id. at 1215-16 (quoting United States Power-Squadron v. State Human Rights
Appeals Board, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (N.Y. 1983)). Applying this rule to the facts of the
present case, the Dale court noted that the "large membership"-over four million boys in
1992-of the BSA "undercut[] its claim to selective membership." Id. at 1215. Indeed, the
organization does not require that its members belong to certain religions or have certain
morals. See id. at 1216. The court also rejected the BSA's claim that it was "distinctly
private" because of greater selectivity with regard to adult members. See id. Accordingly,
"Boy Scouts is not 'distinctly private' because it is not selective in its membership." Id. at
1217.
191. Id. at 1213. The BSA maintained that it is an "'educational facility operated or
maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution."' Id. at 1217 (quoting NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-51). The Dale court quickly dismissed this claim by turning to the language of the
BSA Bylaws and Scout Handbook. See id. There, the BSA promulgates the ideas that "no
member shall be required 'to take part in or observe a religious ceremony distinctly unique'
to a church or other religious organization" and that "religious instruction is better reserved
for 'the home"' than it is for the organization. Id. (quoting BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA
BYLAWS). These principles led the court to conclude that nothing about the BSA would
classify as sectarian or religious. See id. at 1217.
192. See id. at 59. In loco parentis ("[I]n the place of a parent ... with a parent's rights,
duties, responsibilities") occurs when a "person undertakes care and control of another in
absence of such supervision by latter's natural parents and in absence of formal legal
approval." BLACK'S LAW DIcMIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Griego v. Hogan, 377 P.2d
953, 955-56 (N.M. 1963)). In this regard, the BSA argued that the act of forcing it to admit
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However, the Dale court dismissed these arguments' and held that the
BSA "is a 'place of public accommodation' and is not exempt from the
LAD under any of the statute's exceptions."1 '' Finally, the court was
required to determine whether enforcement of LAD violated the BSA's
First Amendment rights of freedom of intimate association, freedom of
expressive association, and freedom of speech.19 The court concluded
that the reinstatement of Dale did not infringe upon the BSA's First
Amendment rights.6 It follows that the BSA, while prohibited by the
state of New Jersey from discriminating on the basis of sexual
preference, will still be able to advance the purposes of scouting.
B. California and the Curran and Randall Decisions
In Curran7 and its companion case, Randall,198 the Supreme Court
of California set forth to answer two questions. First, does the BSA fall
within the relatively narrow confines of its public accommodation
statute, the Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh")? 99 Then, if the BSA is
covered under Unruh as a "business establishment," does enforcement
of the statute violate the BSA or its members' First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to association? °
The facts of Randall, the companion case to Curran, are as follows:
Michael and William Randall, twin nine-year-old brothers, were
Dale as an adult member hindered "'the right of a natural parent or one in loco parentis to
direct the education and upbringing of a child under his control."' Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1217
(quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-51 n.13) (emphasis added). Precedent indicated that in loco
parentis was available only for those who act "function as a parent." Id. The Dale court
declined to categorize the BSA as such because adult members of the Scouts do not have "the
'responsibility to maintain, rear and educate"' the scouts, as do their parents. Id. (quoting
Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 355 (NJ. 1984)) (suggesting that characteristics of the in loco
parentis relationship include the "responsibility to maintain, rear and educate the child.").
193. For purposes of brevity and focus, the exception arguments are not discussed within
the text of this Comment. For a summation of each argument before the court, see supra
notes 190-92.
194. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1218.
195. See id. at 1219-29.
196. See id. at 1229. The First Amendment issues considered by the Dale court extend
beyond the limited focus of this Comment. With that in mind, First Amendment analysis is
triggered by public accommodation analysis. See id. at 1219. For a brief discussion of the
BSA's First Amendment rights as discussed by the appellate court, see supra text
accompanying notes 143-54.
197. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998) (Curran II).
198. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, 952 P.2d 218,219 (Cal. 1998)(Curran II); Randall
v. Orange County Council, 952 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1998).
199. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 219.
200. See id.
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prohibited from advancing as members of the BSA because they refused
to affirm their belief in God."1  Specifically, a requirement of
advancement to the "Bear" rank is that scouts must "'[p]ractice [their]
religion as [they] are taught in [their] home[s], church[es], synagogue[s],
mosque[s] or other religious communit[ies]."' When the Randall boys
indicated that they would be unable to fulfill this requirement, the
Orange County Council posited that the boys could not "participate at
all as Cub Scouts if they do not believe in God."2m Later, the boys'
mother filed a complaint alleging that her sons "were denied equal
access to an organization covered by the [Unruh] Act because they had
no religious beliefs."
In its analysis of Curran and Randall the Supreme Court of
California first addressed the language of Unruh." Unruh provides, in
pertinent part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal,
and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national
origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever."2' Unruh, enacted in 1959, focuses on the language of
"all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."2w The court
noted that this term is to be as broadly construed as "reasonably
possible."' Further, the court, not unlike the Seventh Circuit,
recognized that most other jurisdictions concluded that the BSA was not
a place of public accommodation.20
The court then looked to precedent in its own jurisdiction. Curran
argued that precedent demonstrated that the BSA "must be considered
201. See Randall, 952 P.2d at 262.
20Z Id. at 263.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 235-36; Randall, 952 P.2d at 265-66.
206. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1999).
207. Curran, 952 P.2d at 235-36.
208. Id. at 236 (quoting Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 313, 316 (Cal. 1962)). This
"broad" reading of the term "business establishment" resulted in entities such as
condominium associations falling within the purview of Unruh. See id. (citing O'Connor v.
Village Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 430-31 (Cal. 1983)). The court justified this on the
grounds that "non-profit entities" that "serve the business or economic interests of its owners
or members" are similar to "for profit commercial enterprise." Id. Accordingly, nonprofit
entities also qualify as "business establishments." Id.
209. See id. at 236-37.
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a business establishment for purposes of the Unruh Civil Rights Act., 210
The court disagreed and distinguished the four cases that Curran relied
upon.
First, the court distinguished the BSA from the nonprofit
condominium owners' association in O'Connor when it reasoned that
while both groups are "nonprofit entities," the "formation and
activities" of the BSA are "unrelated to the promotion or advancement
of the economic or business interests of its members."2"'
Then, as to the boys' club in Ibister, the court suggested that it was
necessary to examine the membership policies of an organization to
determine whether each was the equivalent of a "place of public
accommodation or amusement., 21 2 Notably, the boys' club represented
a "'place of public amusement' in that it held itself open to a large
portion of the public and offered admission to a recreational facility.2"3
Boy Scouts, on the other hand, "meet regularly in small groups (often in
private homes)" to practice and study moral and ethical principles
advanced by the BSA.
2 14
Finally, Curran argued that the business activities of the BSA, often
conducted with nonmembers, were enough to bring the group within the
reach of Unruh following the reasoning in Warfield v. Peninsula Golf &
Country Club.2 5 The Supreme Court of California, in Warfield,211
provided that an organization that conducted regular business
transactions with nonmembers, regardless of whether its facilities were
"open to the public" or whether it was selective in choosing its
members, must be considered a business establishment.2"7 The BSA's
210. Id. at 235. Curran contended that the Boy Scouts were indistinguishable from
organizations in the following cases: Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d
776, 796-98 (Cal. 1995) (holding that club with golf course and buildings subject to Unruh);
Burks, 370 P.2d at 319 (holding that real estate developers sale of homes came under Unruh);
O'Connor, 662 P.2d at 430-31 (holding that "age-restriction" policy of condominium
development owned and enforced by the owners of the condo units was a "'business
establishment"' under Unruh); Ibister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 204, 212
(Cal. 1985) (holding that local boys' club was a "'business establishment"' under Unruh").
211. Id. at 236.
212. Id. (quoting Ibister, 707 P.2d at 217).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 237. Warfield v. Peninsula Golf and Country Club, 896 P. 2d 776 (Cal.
1995).
216. 896 P.2d 776.
217. Curran, 952 P.2d at 237-38 (citing 896 P.2d 776). The club in Warfield allowed
nonmembers to pay to use its dining facilities and other services. See Curran, 952 P.2d at
237-38 (citing Warfleld, 896 P.2d at 792).
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business activities 18 are not similar, however. Rather, the BSA does not
allow nonmembers access to its "core functions., 219 By restricting public
access to core functions and by keeping its sales and marketing activities
separate from these core functions, the BSA remains, in the eyes of
California lawmakers, distinctly outside the realm of "business
establishments. '"m This difference separates the BSA from such
"business establishments" or "places of amusement" like the country
club in Warfield.22'
In California, therefore, the BSA does not fit into the category of
"'all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."''" The
Supreme Court of California, once it made this determination, did not
find it necessary to address the BSA's First Amendment freedom of
association argument.223
V. STANDARDS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The Supreme Court provided that only in the context of "denial of
access to public facilities" should Title H be interpreted broadly.' The
purpose of Title II, the Court reiterated in Daniel, was "'to remove the
daily affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access
to facilities ostensibly open to the general public."'t ' Accordingly, any
public accommodation issue would require a broad reading of Title II.
However, the Seventh Circuit was unwilling in Welsh to expand the
reaches of Title II's definition of "place of public accommodation" to
218. The "corporate" side of the BSA has "8,000 employees nation-wide.. . maintains
leaseholds, [and] owns properties." Seaboum v. Coronado Area Council, 891 P.2d 385, 394
(Kan. 1995). The business activities include scout shops, a marketing division that sells
magazines like Boy's Life Magazine, and various other "profit ventures." Id. at 394-95.
219. Curran, 952 P.2d at 238. The "basic activities or services" of the BSA include
meetings, hikes, national gatherings such as the "national jamboree," or training. Id. The
Curran court refers to these as "core functions" of the BSA. Id.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 237; see Warfield, 896 P.2d at 792.
222. Curran, 952 P.2d at 239 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE §51).
223. See id.
224. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1270 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Daniel v.
Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969)). As to the scope of Title II, the court provided that the
"plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent." Id. (citing Ardestani v. INS,
502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991)). That is, no evidence exists of "contrary legislative intent." Id.
Accordingly, the interpretation of Title II is not one of the "'rare and exceptional
circumstances"' when the Court will detour outside of the language of the statute for
congressional intent. Id. (quoting Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 135).
225. Id. (quoting Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, R. 13.1, at 18)).
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generally include "membership organizations."' The Seventh Circuit's
narrow interpretation of Title H flies in the face of precedent, which
suggests that statutory construction of Title II should be broadly
construed.' Nonetheless, the Welsh decision provides a basis for
comparing the decisions of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Dale
and the Supreme Court of California in Curran and Randall.' These
decisions were rendered in the aftermath of Welsh, which is the
fundamental example of what is wrong with public accommodation law
today.
To illustrate, Justice Cummings's dissent in Welsh describes the
majority's interpretation of Title H as "a stingy and narrow reading"
that leaves the BSA in a position to discriminate at will.2 The Supreme
Court of California imparted a similar reading of California's Unruh
Civil Rights Act in Curran.1 Despite the differences in the language
used to refer to places of public accommodation, California's Unruh
Act, like Title H in Welsh, is narrowly construed.'
To illustrate, California adopted the Unruh Civil Rights Act of 1959
to combat the "rather restrictive" interpretations of its old public
accommodation statute. 3 Unruh now contains the broadly worded
category of "all business establishments whatsoever."' m California
precedent indicated that the term must be construed "in the broadest
sense reasonably possible." ' The Ibister decision again expanded the
reach of the statute such that it would apply to any organization ("even
a charitable organization that lacks a significant business-related
purpose") if the organization's attributes and activities make it a
"functional equivalent of a classic 'place of public accommodation or
226. Id.
227. See Edward Bigham, Note, Civil Rights-Seventh Circuit Permits Boy Scouts Of
America To Exclude Atheist-Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1334 (1994).
228. Welsh, 993 F.2d 1270; Dale, 734 A.2d 1196; Curran, 952 P.2d 218,238-39 (Cal. 1998)
(Curran II); Randall, 952 P.2d 261,266 (Cal. 1998).
229. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 267; Dale, 734 A.2d 1196; Curran 952 P.2d at 239-39; Randall,
952 P.2d at 266.
230. 993 F.2d 1267, 1279 (Cummings, J., dissenting). Cummings agreed with the
majority's conclusion that the BSA was free to discriminate on the grounds of religious
principles, but disagreed as to how that result should be obtained. Id. at 1278-84.
231. See 952 P.2d at 237, n.18 (Curran II).
232. Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1270.
233. Curran, 952 P.2d at 237, n.17.
234. Id. at 235-36 (quoting CAL. Civ. CODE §51).
235. Id. (quoting Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 313,316 (Cal. 1962)).
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amusement."' ' 6 On the basis of this idea, the Supreme Court of
California, no doubt taking its cue from the Seventh Circuit in Welsh,
looked to other jurisdictions for authority.'7 The court was in error
when it strayed from California law. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, which
looked to states with similar statutory language to help it justify its
interpretation of Title II, the Surpeme Court of California was limited to
the terms of the Unruh act ("all business establishments of all kinds
whatsoever") that are unique to California.23 As such, the court in
Curran erred when it turned to other jurisdictions.
It follows that, rather than determining if the organization fell within
the broad rubric of a "business establishment of all kinds," the court
examined the BSA in light of a "functional equivalent of a classic 'place
of public accommodation or amusement,"' a much narrower
standard.2' 9-and, at that, a much more restrictive standard than the
legislators sought when they adopted Unruh in 1959.2' Once again, in
Curran the BSA was not classified as a place of public accommodation
because it is not tied to a building or physical structure. 24'
The Dale court refused to follow the lead of the Seventh Circuit.242
Instead, the court stuck to familiar precedent, that of Little League,243
and the reasoning that the term "place," as used by LAD, is "a term of
convenience, not of limitation."' Looking to Little League, the court
had this to say about its decision to apply LAD to a municipally owned
Little League:
The "place" of public accommodation in the case of Little
236. Id. (quoting Ibister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212, 217-18 (Cal.
1985)).
237. Id. at 237, n.18. The court cited to Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1270
(7th Cir. 1993), Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, 891 P.2d 385, 394 (Kan. 1995), Scwenk v.
Boy Scouts of Am., 551 P.2d 465 (Or. 1976), Boy Scout of America v. Quinnipiac, 527 A.2 352,
and Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270,275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), affd, 734
A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999). in its assessment of what other decisions other jurisdictions rendered.
238. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE §51). Of the cases that the court cites, all five involve
statutes that contain the term "place of public accommodation" and none refer to "business
establishments." See supra, Part IV.
239. Id. at 236 (quoting Ibister, 707 P.2d 212, 219).
240. See id. at 237, n.17 (citing Warfield v. Pennisula Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776,
784 (Cal. 1998).
241. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 236-37.
242. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1209.
243. National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1974).
244. Id. at 37.
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League is obviously the ball field at which tryouts are arranged,
instructions given, practices held and games played. The
statutory "accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges"
at the place of public accommodation, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f), is the
entire agglomeration of the arrangements which Little League
and its local chartered leagues make and the facilities they
provide for the playing of baseball by the children.245
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, following this line
of reasoning, reiterated that "'place' has been more than a fixed location
since 1974. '246 This idea corresponds with the court's statement in Little
League that although most "places" of public accommodation are
"fixed" sites like hotels and restaurants, some "places"-trains, for
example-have a "moving situs. ,2 47 This "term of convenience, not of
limitation" rationale allowed the court to interpret the statute broadly
rather than in the "restrictive" method seen in Welsh and Curran.
Hopefully, the Dale decision, with its well-reasoned interpretation of
the meaning of "place," will come to stand at the forefront of public
accommodation case law. The reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in
Welsh, while well-intended, ends up leaving the "Boy Scouts and other
like organizations free to discriminate not just against atheists-or those
whose beliefs arguably conflict with the group's most central
philosophy-but against anyone at all on sheer whim."2' While this
result can be attributed to the court's narrow interpretation of the term
"place," one Justice suggested that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
draft a statute without using the term "place."249 If it is truly impossible
to find alternative means of defining places of public accommodation,
other measures are necessary to avoid undue discrimination. In the
future, undecided states should look to New Jersey's Dale for
furtherance of the idea of the term "place" as a "term of convenience,
not of limitation. ''
245. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1209 (quoting Little League, 318 A.2d at 37).
246. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1209.
247. 318 A.2d at 37.
248. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1279 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cummings, J.,
dissenting).
249. See id. at 1282 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
250. National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 317 A.2d. 33, 37 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps after twenty-three years of decisions, jurisdictions
addressing the Boy Scouts of America and public accommodation
questions will reach some consistent end. However, it appears that,
given the differences in statutory language and inconsistent methods of
statutory construction, no such end is in sight. Until then, the Boy
Scouts of America, a large, incorporated, albeit non-profit organization,
with members in all fifty states, will continue to be allowed to
discriminate on the basis of sex, religion, or other grounds in the courts
of California, Kansas, Oregon, and the Seventh Circuit. As for Carla
Schwenk, Timothy Curran, twins Michael and William Randall,
Bradford Seabourn, Mark Welsh, and countless others, the lesson is a
simple one: unless you play by its rules, and believe in its principles, the
Boy Scouts of America does not want you. This from an organization
that prides itself on teaching boys to "have a keen respect for the basic
rights of all people."2'
WILLIAM F. GRADY*
251. Fact Sheet: What Is Boy Scouting?, supra note 40.
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